

# [MS-OCSP]: Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) Extensions

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## Revision Summary

Date	Revision History	Revision Class	Comments
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10/08/2010	1.0	No change	No changes to the meaning, language, or formatting of the technical content.
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02/11/2011	2.0	No change	No changes to the meaning, language, or formatting of the technical content.

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# 1 Introduction

The Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) Extensions specify the Microsoft implementation of the Lightweight Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) Profile for High Volume Environments [\[RFC5019\]](#), a profile of the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) [\[RFC2560\]](#) and any extensions to [\[RFC5019\]](#). Within this document, the term "this protocol" refers to the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) Extensions.

Familiarity with **public key infrastructure (PKI)** concepts, such as asymmetric and symmetric cryptography, asymmetric and **symmetric encryption** techniques, digital **certificate** concepts, and cryptographic **key** establishment are required for a complete understanding of this protocol specification. [\[CRYPTO\]](#) provides an excellent introduction to cryptography and PKI concepts. [\[X509\]](#) provides an excellent introduction to PKI and certificate concepts.

## 1.1 Glossary

The following terms are defined in [\[MS-GLOS\]](#):

**certificate**  
**certification authority (CA)**  
**certificate revocation list (CRL)**  
**client**  
**key**  
**object identifier (OID)**  
**private key**  
**public key**  
**public key infrastructure (PKI)**  
**registration authority (RA)**  
**relying party (RP)**  
**remote procedure call (RPC)**  
**revocation**  
**symmetric encryption**  
**trust**

The following terms are specific to this document:

**request:** A message from a **client** to an OCSP **responder**. The message requests the **revocation** status of an X.509 **certificate** (see [\[RFC2560\]](#)).

**response:** A message from an OCSP **responder**. The message specifies the status of an X.509 **certificate** (see [\[RFC2560\]](#)).

**responder:** An OCSP Extensions server that provides OCSP **responses** (see [\[RFC2560\]](#)).

**MAY, SHOULD, MUST, SHOULD NOT, MUST NOT:** These terms (in all caps) are used as described in [\[RFC2119\]](#). All statements of optional behavior use either MAY, SHOULD, or SHOULD NOT.

## 1.2 References

### 1.2.1 Normative References

We conduct frequent surveys of the normative references to assure their continued availability. If you have any issue with finding a normative reference, please contact [dochelp@microsoft.com](mailto:dochelp@microsoft.com). We will assist you in finding the relevant information. Please check the archive site, <http://msdn2.microsoft.com/en-us/library/E4BD6494-06AD-4aed-9823-445E921C9624>, as an additional source.

[FIPS140] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2: Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules", December 2002, <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips140-2/fips1402.pdf>

[ITUX690] ITU-T, "ASN.1 Encoding Rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)", Recommendation X.690, July 2002, <http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/languages/X.690-0207.pdf>

[LWOCSP] Deacon, A. and Hurst, R., "Lightweight OCSP Profile for High Volume Environments", February 2007, <http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-pkix-lightweight-ocsp-profile-09>

[MS-CSRA] Microsoft Corporation, "[Certificate Services Remote Administration Protocol Specification](#)", July 2006.

[MS-OCSPA] Microsoft Corporation, "[Microsoft OCSP Administration Protocol Specification](#)", January 2008.

[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997, <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt>

[RFC2315] Kaliski, B., "PKCS #7: Cryptographic Message Syntax Version 1.5", RFC 2315, March 1998, <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2315.txt>

[RFC2560] Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A., et al., "X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP", RFC 2560, June 1999, <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2560.txt>

[RFC2616] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., et al., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999, <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2616.txt>

[RFC2797] Myers, M., Liu, X., Schaad, J., and Weinstein, J., "Certificate Management Messages Over CMS", RFC 2797, April 2000, <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2797.txt>

[RFC2986] Nystrom, M., and Kaliski, B., "PKCS#10: Certificate Request Syntax Specification", RFC 2986, November 2000, <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2986.txt>

[RFC3280] Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W., and Solo, D., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280, April 2002, <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3280.txt>

[RFC5019] Deacon, A., and Hurst, R., "The Lightweight Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) Profile for High-Volume Environments", RFC 5019, September 2007, <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5019.txt>

[X509] ITU-T, "Information Technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory: Public-Key and Attribute Certificate Frameworks", Recommendation X.509, August 2005, <http://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.509/en>

**Note** There is a charge to download the specification.

[X660] ITU-T, "Information Technology - Open Systems Interconnection - Procedures for the Operation of OSI Registration Authorities: General Procedures and Top Arcs of the ASN.1 Object Identifier Tree", Recommendation X.660, August 2004, <http://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.660/en>

**Note** There is a charge to download the specification.

## 1.2.2 Informative References

[CRYPTO] Menezes, A., Vanstone, S., and Oorschot, P., "Handbook of Applied Cryptography", 1997, <http://www.cacr.math.uwaterloo.ca/hac/>

[HOWARD] Howard, M., "Writing Secure Code", Microsoft Press, 2002, ISBN: 0735617228.


[MS-GLOS] Microsoft Corporation, "[Windows Protocols Master Glossary](#)", March 2007.

## 1.3 Overview

The Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP), defined in [\[RFC2560\]](#), provides a mechanism, in lieu of or as a supplement to checking against a periodic **CRL**, to obtain timely information regarding the **revocation** status of a certificate (see [\[RFC3280\]](#) section 3.3). OCSP enables applications to determine the (revocation) state of an identified X.509 certificate (see [\[X509\]](#)). The Lightweight Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) Profile for High-Volume Environments ([\[RFC5019\]](#)) provides a profile of OCSP that specifies a subset of the functionality of the complete OCSP defined in [\[RFC2560\]](#). This protocol specifies the data that needs to be exchanged between an application that checks the status of a certificate and the **responder** that provides the status.

OCSP is a component of a public key infrastructure (PKI). A PKI consists of a system of digital certificates, **certification authority (CAs)**, and other **registration authorities (RAs)** that verify and authenticate the validity of each party involved in an electronic transaction through the use of **public key** cryptography.

The certificate status received as a result of using OCSP is known as a **response** from an OCSP responder. The OCSP request/response process involves a number of different machines (or functions that might be hosted on the same machine), as indicated in Figure 1.



**Figure 1: Response from an OCSP**

In Figure 1, the principal components are as follows:

1. CA: The CA that provides certificate status information to the OCSP responder through the use of CRLs.

2. **Relying party (RP)**: The resource guard that validates a certificate chain and contacts an OCSP responder to **request** certificate status.
3. OCSP responder: An authoritative source for certificate revocation status (see [\[RFC3280\]](#) section 3.3). The protocols and data structures used for OCSP are defined in section [2.2](#). The connection over which OCSP is conducted is shown in Figure 1 as a solid bold horizontal line.

#### 1.4 Relationship to Other Protocols

The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1) [\[RFC2616\]](#) is the transport protocol for Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) Extensions messages.

#### 1.5 Prerequisites/Preconditions

This protocol requires HTTP/1.1 ([\[RFC2616\]](#)) for transport of all messages.

This protocol assumes the following:

The **client** may discover the OCSP Extensions server through the Authority Information Access (AIA) extension that is defined in [\[RFC3280\]](#) section 4.2.2.1 or through a URL configured through out-of-band means. [<1>](#)

#### 1.6 Applicability Statement

This protocol is applicable to an environment in which clients are able to interact with an OCSP responder for the purpose of requesting the revocation status of an [\[X509\]](#) certificate.

#### 1.7 Versioning and Capability Negotiation

None.

#### 1.8 Vendor-Extensible Fields

None.

#### 1.9 Standards Assignments

None.

## 2 Messages

The following sections specify how messages of the OCSP Extensions are transported and encoded on the wire.

### 2.1 Transport

OCSP is commonly used over HTTP [\[RFC2616\]](#), although additional transports are allowed per [\[RFC2560\]](#) section 4.1.<2>

This protocol uses HTTP as the transport.

### 2.2 Message Syntax

The following sections define the message syntax for OCSP Extensions. OCSP messages are defined in ASN.1 as described in [\[X660\]](#) and encoded by using DER encoding as described in [\[ITUX690\]](#).

#### 2.2.1 Common Structures

Clients and servers that implement OCSP MUST use the ASN.1 structures specified in [\[RFC2560\]](#) when constructing an OCSP request and response. The following fields are introduced and defined in sections 4.1 and 4.2 of [\[RFC2560\]](#), respectively, and are used by this protocol.

```
OCSPRequest
  TBSRequest
  OPTIONAL Signature

OCSPResponse
  OCSPResponseStatus
  ResponseBytes
```

Detailed server processing information is in section [3.2](#)



## 3 Protocol Details

The following sections specify protocol details, including abstract data models and message processing rules.

### 3.1 Client Details

The client role in OCSP Extensions is to generate a request, as specified in section [2.2.1](#), and upon receipt, validate the response.

#### 3.1.1 Abstract Data Model

None.

#### 3.1.2 Timers

None.

#### 3.1.3 Initialization

None.

#### 3.1.4 Higher-Layer Triggered Events

None.

#### 3.1.5 Processing Events and Sequencing Rules

OCSP request creation MUST adhere to [\[RFC5019\]](#) section 2.1.<3>

When an OCSP Extensions client processes the response from a responder, it enforces that the response is signed by one of the following keys:

- The **private key** that was used to sign the inspected certificate.
- A private key with a corresponding certificate that was signed by using the same private key that was used to sign the inspected certificate.

#### 3.1.6 Timer Events

None.

#### 3.1.7 Other Local Events

None.

### 3.2 Server Details

The following sections define the server sequencing and processing rules for the OCSP implementation.<4>

### 3.2.1 Abstract Data Model

**Revoked Certificates List:** The server maintains a list of revoked certificates and maintains the following fields for each revoked certificate:

- Certificate serial number, as specified in [\[RFC3280\]](#) section 4.1.2.2.
- Revocation date and time, as specified in [\[RFC3280\]](#) section 5.3.3.
- Revocation reason, as specified in [\[RFC3280\]](#) section 5.3.1.

**OCSP Signing Key Pair:** The server maintains a private key with which to sign OCSP responses. The server holds a certificate that has the associated public key, which is delivered to OCSP clients to verify that the server can authorize OCSP responses.

**Nonce Policy:** The server maintains exactly one variable that is called a Nonce Policy, which can have one of two values: "Allowed" or "Not Allowed". The initial value is "Not Allowed". This variable can be changed directly on the OCSP Extensions server.

### 3.2.2 Timers

None.

### 3.2.3 Initialization

The responder MUST acquire a certificate as defined in [\[RFC2560\]](#) section 4.2.2.2.

### 3.2.4 Higher-Layer Triggered Events

None.

### 3.2.5 Processing Events and Sequencing Rules

The OCSP Extensions server processes the OCSP requests and generates the OCSP response as follows:

1. While [\[RFC5019\]](#) section 2.1.1 specifies only that the client "MUST include only one Request in the OCSPRequest.RequestList structure", if the **requestList** field of the request includes multiple requests, the OCSP Extensions responder rejects the request with an "unauthorized" response. The unauthorized response is specified in [\[RFC2560\]](#) section 2.3.
2. While [\[RFC5019\]](#) section 2.1.1 specifies only that "this profile RECOMMENDS that [the requestExtensions structure] contain only the nonce extension", if the request contains a critical extension that is not the Nonce extension, the OCSP Extensions responder rejects with an "unauthorized" response. The unauthorized response is specified in [\[RFC2560\]](#) section 2.3.
3. If the request is signed, the OCSP Extensions responder ignores the signature and processes the request as though it were an unsigned request, as specified in [\[RFC5019\]](#) section 2.1.2.
4. While [\[RFC5019\]](#) section 2.1.1 specifies only that "this profile RECOMMENDS that [the requestExtensions structure] contain only the nonce extension", if the request contains a noncritical extension, the OCSP Extensions responder ignores the extension.
5. The **responseType** field for all OCSP responses is id-pkix-ocsp-basic, as defined in [\[RFC2560\]](#) section 4.2.1.

6. While [\[RFC5019\]](#) section 2.1.1 specifies only that "OCSPRequests conformant to this profile MUST include only one Request in the OCSPRequest.RequestList structure", it is also true that the **responses** field of all responses includes a single response.
7. The Nonce extension that is defined in [\[RFC2560\]](#) section 4.4.1 can be included in requests in the **requestExtensions** field. If the OCSP Extensions responder Nonce Policy is set to "Allowed", the responder includes the Nonce extension in the **responseExtensions** field of the response. If the Nonce Policy is set to "Not Allowed", the responder rejects the request with an "unauthorized" response as specified in [\[RFC2560\]](#) section 2.3.
8. The OCSP Extensions responder includes a noncritical extension that has an **OID** of 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.21.4 in the **singleExtensions** field of the response. This field contains the specified OID only if the CA issues a CRL that contains the same CRL.Next.Publish extension as specified in [\[MS-CSRA\]](#) section 3.1.2.
9. The value of the extension referenced above, with an OID of 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.21.4, contains the time when the next revocation information is expected to be published. This time may be sooner than the **NextUpdate** field. The extension value is DER-encoded and is defined in ASN.1 [\[X509\]](#), as the following example shows.

```
CHOICE {
    utcTime      UTCTime,
    generalTime  GeneralizedTime
}
```

If the time is after 1950 and before 2050, it is UTC time that is encoded with a two-digit year. Otherwise, the time is Generalized time that is encoded with a four-digit year. The date is precise to seconds.

10. The OCSP Extensions responder adds the HTTP headers as specified in [\[LWOCSP\]](#) section 4 for an OCSPResponse.
11. If the OCSPRequest is preceded by the conditional HTTP headers "If-Modified-Since" or "If-None-Match", the OCSP Extensions responder evaluates whether it has a newer OCSPResponse value (a newer value than what is specified in the condition) for the OCSPRequest value, and responds with an HTTP 304 (not modified) status message if it does not (see [\[RFC2616\]](#)).

With the exception of the deviations and extensions previously enumerated, OCSP request processing and response generation complies with [\[RFC5019\]](#).

### 3.2.6 Timer Events


None.

### 3.2.7 Other Local Events

None.

## 4 Protocol Example

The client determines that it must validate the revocation status of a certificate. When the client invokes the revocation-checking process, the following event sequence occurs:



**Figure 2: Revocation-checking process**

1. The OCSF Extensions client generates an OCSF request as specified in section [3.1.5](#) and submits the request to the responder.
2. The responder inspects the requests and generates a response as specified in section [3.2.5](#).

## 5 Security

The following sections specify security considerations for implementers of the OCSP Extensions.

### 5.1 Security Considerations for Implementers

Any cryptographic protocol has security considerations with key handling during cryptographic operations and key distribution. Although a public-key certificate is not a protocol by itself, it has most of the same security considerations of a cryptographic protocol in the sense that a public key certificate is a message from the CA to the RP—a message addressed, in effect, "to whom it may concern." A cryptographic protocol that deals with the transmission or issuance or other use of a public key certificate therefore has security considerations in two areas: around the protocol itself and around the certificate and its use.

In addition, a certificate binds two or more pieces of information together. In the most common case, that is a public key and a name. The name in such a certificate has security relevance and there are security considerations around the use and provisioning of those names. In some certificate forms, there are attributes bound to either a name or a key, and there are security considerations regarding the use and provisioning of those attributes.

#### 5.1.1 Keeping Information Secret

Any cryptographic key must be kept secret. Any function of a secret (such as a key schedule) must also be kept secret, because knowing such functions would reduce an attacker's work in cryptanalyzing the secret.

When a secret must be stored in the normal memory of a general-purpose computer in order to be used, that secret should be erased (for example, replaced with a constant value, such as 0) as soon as possible after use.

A secret may be stored in specially protected memory where it can be used without being erased. Typically, one finds such memory in a hardware security module (HSM). If an HSM is used, it should be compliant with [\[FIPS140\]](#), or the equivalent at a level consistent with the security requirements of the customer deploying the cryptographic protocol or the CA that uses the HSM.

#### 5.1.2 Coding Practices

Any implementation of a protocol exposes code to security attacks. Such code must be developed according to secure coding and development practices in order to avoid buffer overflows, denial-of-service attacks, escalation of privilege, and disclosure of information. For an introduction to these concepts, secure development best practices, and common errors, see [\[HOWARD\]](#).

#### 5.1.3 Security Consideration Citations

Implementers of this protocol should take care to consider the following security considerations:

- A client or server should follow generally accepted principles of secure key management. For more information, see section 9 of [\[RFC3280\]](#). For an introduction to these generally accepted principles, see [\[CRYPTO\]](#) and [\[HOWARD\]](#).
- Clients and servers should validate cryptographic parameters prior to issuing or accepting certificates. For more information, see section 9 of [\[RFC2797\]](#).

- A client and server should validate and verify the certificate path information identified in section 6 of [\[RFC3280\]](#). See section 9 of [\[RFC3280\]](#) for more information on the requirement for certificate path validation.
- A client and server should validate and verify the freshness of revocation information of all digital certificates prior to usage, **trust**, or encryption as identified in section 6.3 of [\[RFC3280\]](#). See section 9 of [\[RFC3280\]](#) for more information on the requirement for revocation freshness.
- A client or server should follow all security considerations in section 5 of [\[RFC2560\]](#).
- A client or server should follow all security considerations discussed throughout [\[RFC2315\]](#) and [\[RFC2986\]](#) as neither normative reference has a specific security section.
- A client and server should use an authenticated HTTP session between client and server to mitigate denial-of-service attacks. For more information on generic denial-of-service mitigation techniques, see [HOWARD].

## 5.2 Index of Security Parameters

None.

## 6 Appendix A: Product Behavior

The information in this specification is applicable to the following Microsoft products or supplemental software. References to product versions include released service packs:

- Windows Vista® operating system
- Windows Server® 2008 operating system
- Windows® 7 operating system
- Windows Server® 2008 R2 operating system

Exceptions, if any, are noted below. If a service pack or Quick Fix Engineering (QFE) number appears with the product version, behavior changed in that service pack or QFE. The new behavior also applies to subsequent service packs of the product unless otherwise specified. If a product edition appears with the product version, behavior is different in that product edition.

Unless otherwise specified, any statement of optional behavior in this specification that is prescribed using the terms SHOULD or SHOULD NOT implies product behavior in accordance with the SHOULD or SHOULD NOT prescription. Unless otherwise specified, the term MAY implies that the product does not follow the prescription.

[<1> Section 1.5:](#) Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2 use only the URL specified in the validated certificate AIA extension.

[<2> Section 2.1:](#) OCSP Extensions conform to OCSP over HTTP as specified in [\[RFC2560\]](#) Appendix A.

[<3> Section 3.1.5:](#) OCSP clients that run Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2 generate the OCSP request as follows:

- The version field is set to 1.
- The **requestorName** and **requestExtensions** request fields are not included in the request.
- The requestList always contains only one request.
- The **CertId** field always uses the SHA-1 hash algorithm.
- The OCSP Extensions client does not sign the requests.

[<4> Section 3.2:](#) Only Windows Server 2008 and Windows Server 2008 R2 can perform the server role.

## 7 Change Tracking

No table of changes is available. The document is either new or has had no changes since its last release.



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